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Abstract Recent empirical work on non-philosophers’ intuitions about epistemic 
normativity reveals patterns that cannot be fully accounted for by direct epistemic 
consequentialism. On the basis of these results, one might picture participants as 
“epistemic deontologists.”We present the results of two new experiments that support 
a more nuanced picture. We examine intuitions about guesses and hypotheses, and 
about beliefs. Our results suggest a two-factor model of intuitions, wherein both consequentialist 
and non-consequentialist considerations affect participants’ judgments 
about epistemic permissibility. 
 
1 Epistemic normativity and consequentialism 
Epistemically speaking, is it okay for me to believe P, or not? This is a question about 
epistemic normativity. In recent years, the idea that epistemic normativity should be 
understood in consequentialist terms has received quite a bit of attention.1 The basic 
idea behind epistemic consequentialism is that the epistemic right or permissible is to 
be understood fully in terms of conduciveness to the epistemic good. Berker  
provides a framework for thinking about consequentialist theories.2 According to this 
framework, theories can vary along three dimensions: final value, overall value, and 
deontic theory. 
A theory of final value says what is ultimately or fundamentally of epistemic value 
or disvalue. For example, some of the most often discussed versions of epistemic consequentialism 
say that the only things of final value are true beliefs and the only things 
of final disvalue are false beliefs. We will follow the convention of using “veritist” to 
refer to those theories that endorse such an account of final value. It is important to 
note that veritism is not the only theory of final value that is available to the epistemic 
consequentialist. There are also other understandings of epistemic final value available 
that take into account other features of beliefs (e.g., how important, informative, or 
interesting they are) or belief sets (e.g., coherence) in addition to or in place of purely 
veritist concerns.3 
Atheory of overall value provides away of ranking epistemic acts like the forming of 
beliefs. For example, a veritistmight say that the overall value of forming any particular 
belief is the net balance of true beliefs over false beliefs thatwould be brought about by 
forming that belief. An alternative veritist account might say that the overall value of a 
belief is the net balance of true over false beliefs that the agent expectswould be brought 
about by forming that belief. An account of overall epistemic value thus provides a 
way to rank the options available to an agent. It might tell one, for example, that belief 
x is better than belief y which is better than belief z. Epistemic consequentialists who 
accept a richer account of final value, in which something other than truth or falsity 
is of final value, must adapt their theory of overall value accordingly. Note that one 
might want to advance a theory of overall value that assigns overall values (and thus 
a ranking) to something other than beliefs, for instance, to other epistemic “actions” 
such as assumptions, hypotheses, or belief-forming processes. 
A deontic theory delineates the epistemic right and wrong.4 A theory of overall 
value does not itself tell us which epistemic acts are permissible or impermissible: the 
fact that x is better than y which is better than z is compatible with all three acts being 
permissible or impermissible. One straightforward deontic theory, especially relevant 
to this paper, is direct epistemic consequentialism (DEC): it is right for a subject to x 
at a specific time if and only if x maximizes overall epistemic value for that subject at 
that time.5 However, as is the case in normative ethics, an epistemic consequentialist 
has a great variety of deontic theories to choose from; these choices include indirect 
consequentialist theories, satisficing accounts, and so on.6 We will encounter some of 
these in a little more detail later on. 
2 The role of intuitions 
 
Epistemic consequentialism has some attractive characteristics (Dunn 2016).However, 
questions have been raised about certain counterintuitive implications of epistemic 
consequentialist views like DEC (Berker 2013; Elstein and Jenkins forthcoming). 
Although such considerations may not have the final word, if a view has counterintuitive 
implications, this is often seen by epistemologists as a strike against it. One of 
the best ways to bring out the potentially damaging counterintuitive implications is 
by looking at some thought experiments: the Truth Fairy case (based on Elstein and 
Jenkins forthcoming) and the John Doe case (Berker 2013, p. 369; Firth 1981). 
Truth Fairy. Suppose you start with no reason to believe that p is true and no 
reason to believe that it is false. Now suppose you come across the Truth Fairy 
whomakes you the following offer: if you believe p, she willmake your epistemic 
situation very, very good overall. She will arrange for you to have whatever your 
preferred account of epistemic value says is very, very good—many, many true 
beliefs, and very, very few false ones, a completely coherent and maximally 
informative belief set, etc. However, she does not guarantee that your trust in p 
itself will have any particular epistemic status as a result of her actions. 
John Doe. John Doe is a brilliant set theorist who is on the cusp of proving the 
Continuum Hypothesis: all he needs is six more months. But, alas, poor John 
is suffering from a serious illness that, according to his doctors, will almost 
certainly kill him in two months’ time. John stubbornly clings to a belief that he 
will recover from his illness, and not only does this belief comfort him, but—let 
us suppose—it in fact significantly raises the chances that he will live for the six 
months that he needs both to complete his proof and to derive from it a variety of 
consequences for the rest of set theory. In other words, John’s belief that he will 
recover is a causal means to his procuring a large number of true set-theoretic 
beliefs sometime in the future. 
These thought experiments provide the foundation of an intuition based argument 
against certain forms of epistemic consequentialism (Berker 2013; Elstein and Jenkins 
forthcoming). DEC, for instance, is committed to the idea that it is epistemically 
permissible, indeed required, to accept the Truth Fairy’s offer and for John Doe to 
believe that he will recover from his illness (supposing a veritist view of final value). 
However, based on thought experiments such as those mentioned, one can see that 
intuitively it is not epistemically acceptable to believe something that one has no 
independent reason to believe simply because that is what will bring about the best 
epistemic consequences. This means, concludes the argument, that certain forms of 
consequentialism are problematic. In other words, if consequentialism were right, 
consequences would be all that mattered, but something else intuitively matters in 
cases like these, as demonstrated by the thought experiments.7 
3 Lay intuitions 
This article is concerned with folk epistemology and with examining folk intuitions 
about justification (regarding guesses, hypotheses, and beliefs). If intuitions are relevant 
to philosophical theories, as the Truth Fairy and John Doe thought experiments 
presuppose, as well as the intuition based argument, there is reason to be concerned 
with what non-philosophers’ intuitions are (hereafter “lay intuitions”). This is not to 
say that lay intuitions are preferable to the intuitions of philosophers, but neither is it 
to deny this. It is only to say that if we are concerned with what is intuitive, it is worth 
investigating what non-philosophers think, and for a few reasons: 
1. Lay intuitions may be less prone to theoretical bias and so better indicators of what 
is genuinely intuitive than philosophers’ intuitions. (Goldman 2007) 
2. Lay intuitions may provide better information about concepts that play a role in 
our everyday discourse and practice. (Alexander and Weinberg 2007) 
3. If lay intuitions and those of philosophers differed, this might raise important 
methodological questions about the practice of relying on intuitions in this debate. 
(see, e.g., the discussion in Pritchard 2014) 
With regard to 1–3, it is of course important to note the existence of entrenched 
debates in philosophy about the relative importance of philosophers’ intuitions versus 
lay intuitions (Nado 2014). This is not the place to settle those debates. To whatever 
extent lay intuitions are relevant to philosophical theories, this paper is relevant to 
philosophical theories. 
Lay intuitions are not an a priori matter but an empirical matter to be investigated 
usingmethods similar to those used in the social sciences. Recently, some progress has 
been made in investigating lay intuitions about epistemic consequentialism (Andow 
2016a). Andow’s findings lend some support to the claim that lay intuitions are consistent 
with certain philosophers’ intuitions to the effect that it is not epistemically 
acceptable to believe something that one has no independent reason to believe simply 
because doing so will increase the positive epistemic consequences. Across two experiments, 
Andow shows that participants’ intuitive judgements about the permissibility 
of adopting attitudes are sensitive to factors that views like DEC would not predict. 
Specifically, participants’ permissibility judgements in Andow’s experiments were 
sensitive to the means by which an epistemic good was obtained. In his experiments, 
some participants were asked to consider cases in which a researcher has the opportunity 
to change the course of her research by using different equipment that will have the 
effect of increasing the number of correct results she gets. The participants were then 
asked to say whether this change is “okay” on a 100-point scale (from completely disagree 
to completely agree). The mean responses were 69–72. Other participants were 
asked to consider cases in which a researcher can increase the number of correct results 
by making an assumption for which it is never stated that there is any independent 
motivation and sometimes even stated that there is not. Participants were then asked to 
say whether this change is okay. The mean responses were 25–41. In summary, even 
though both changing the equipment and making the assumption increased the epistemic 
good (the number of correct results), participants found a change of equipment 
more permissible than changing the research by making an assumption. 
Andow’s (2016a) experiments leave some important questions unanswered. Andow 
sets up his experiments with reference to ethical trolley cases. This setup invites a 
particular interpretation about what considerations participants are sensitive to. On the 
basis of his results, we might picture participants as “epistemic deontologists” who 
find it permissible to bring about the maximization of epistemic value so long as it 
does not involve using epistemic disvalue (making an assumption on the basis of no 
evidence) as a means to maximize epistemic utility. However, Andow’s results as they 
stand do not permit us tomake this inference. Both of his experiments involve contrasts 
between cases which do not (or barely) differ in terms of consequences. So, we cannot 
conclude that his participants are deontologists who think that consequences make 
no difference. In other words, to test whether people are deontologists it is necessary 
to use a factorial design where both consequences and means are varied, but Andow 
only manipulated the means. Are people epistemic deontologists? We designed and 
ran two studies to find out. 
4 Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was performed to investigate people’s intuitions about the epistemic 
permissibility of certain epistemic acts (making a guess or forming a hypothesis) performed 
by a hypothetical individual named Sam. Sam’s decisions were either based 
on evidence or not, and either the consequences of the decisions were good or bad. For 
each case, participantswere asked whether the act is justified. If participants are consequentialists, 
we should expect only consequences to affect whether they agree the act 
is justified. If they are deontologists, we should expect only evidence to affect whether 
they agree the act is justified. We find that participants do not fit into either category. 
4.1 Participants 
207 participants recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk completed the survey. We 
required participants to have at least a 95% HIT approval rate and at least a US high 
school diploma. The experiment was run until at least 40 participants in each group 
answered all the comprehension items correctly (the comprehension items will be 
explained in “Materials and procedure”). Of the 207 participants, 32 were removed 
for answering one or more comprehension questions incorrectly, and 3 were removed 
for having any formal academic training in philosophy whatsoever. Of the remaining 
172 participants, 106 identified as female and the median age was 37. 
4.2 Materials and procedure 
The survey was created and administered using Qualtrics, Version 2016 and Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Participants only received one Case Type selected at random (Evidence No-Bad, 
Evidence No-Good, Evidence Yes-Bad, Evidence Yes-Good). The Case Types were 
designed so that Sam’s potential decision would either be based on a guess or on an 
empirically informed hypothesis, and the consequence would be either bad or good. 
Participants experienced four Case Versions of their assigned Case Type, presented in 
a random order. The four Case Versions were designed to be structurally similar.  
Each case was presented over two screens. The initial screen presented the selected 
case with three comprehension items, where two items were true and either the first or 
last was false. For example, for the Experiment Case Version the first comprehension 
item read, “Given the current direction of Sam’s research, Sam will end up being 
[wrong or correct] about the 5 key claims.” The second item read, “To change the 
direction of the research, Sam could make a particular [guess or hypothesis].” The 
third item read, “By changing the direction of the research, Sam will end up being 
[wrong or correct] about the 5 key claims.” After responding to the comprehension 
items, participants clicked a button to continue. 
The second screen presented participants with the same case along with a target 
item called “Justified” that read, “The [guess or hypothesis] is justified.” Participants 
indicated how much they agree with this item on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 (from 
completely disagree to completely agree) with the starting position set at 50. 
After completing the four CaseVersions, participantswere asked about their gender, 
age, experience in formal philosophical academic training, and for any other comments 
they had about the survey. 
4.3 Results 
Evidence No-Bad cases garnered the lowest responses, followed byEvidenceYes-Bad, 
Evidence No-Good, and finally Evidence Yes-Good. 
To compare responses, a mixed-measures ANOVA was conducted with Consequence 
(Bad, Good) and Evidence (No, Yes) as between-subjects factors, and Case 
Version (Experiment, Plant, Marble, Train) as a within-subjects factor. 
Regarding the within-subjects effects, the ANOVA revealed a significant effect 
of Case Version (F(1, 504) = 3.53, p = 0.02, η2 p= 0.02). None of the interactions 
were significant (all p’s> 0.25). This effect size forCaseVersion is generally regarded 
as small, as one can use the same rule of thumb to interpret partial eta squared as eta 
squared (a small effect = 0.01, medium = 0.06, and large = 0.14; Pallant, 2010, p. 
4.4 Experiment 1 discussion 
Experiment 1’s results reveal that there are two factors that are important to people 
when considering the permissibility of epistemic acts: Consequence and Evidence. 
Notably the effects of Consequence were stronger than Evidence. Experiment 1 
involves the permissibility of making guesses and hypotheses, but the philosophical 
literature mostly concerns the epistemic permissibility of forming beliefs or accepting 
propositions (Dunn 2016). Hence, to more directly engage with the literature, 
Experiment 2 was performed. 
5 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was performed to investigate people’s intuitions about the epistemic 
permissibility of forming beliefs. For each case, participants were asked whether the 
belief is justified. If the results of this study differ from Experiment 1, this suggests 
that norms concerning belief take a different form from those concerning guesses and 
hypotheses. 
5.1 Participants 
231 new participants recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk completed the survey. 
We required participants to have at least a 95% HIT approval rate and at least a US 
high school diploma. The experiment was run until at least 40 participants in each 
group answered all the comprehension items correctly. Of the 231 participants, 47 
were removed for answering one or more comprehension items incorrectly, and 9 
were removed for having any formal academic training in philosophy whatsoever. Of 
the remaining 175 participants, 89 identified as female and the median age was 39. 
5.2 Materials and procedure 
The materials and procedure for Experiment 2 were similar to Experiment 1 except 
for the following details that were altered for the cases and target item. 
The cases were designed to be similar to Experiment 1, with the relevant changes 
made as needed to produce belief cases. For example, while the Experiment 1 Case 
Versions formerly read, “Bymaking this [guess or hypothesis]…” for Experiment 2 the 
Case Versions read, “By forming this belief…” Adjustments were also made for the target item. While in 
Experiment 1 the targetitems read, “The [guess or hypothesis] is justified,” in Experiment 2 the target item 
read, “The belief is justified.” 
5.3 Results 
Descriptively, the Evidence No-Bad cases received the lowest ratings, followed by Evidence Yes-Bad, 
Evidence No-Good (though note that Evidence Yes-Bad and Evidence No-Good were 
very similar), and finally Evidence Yes-Good. 
To compare responses, a mixed-measures ANOVA was conducted with Consequence 
(Bad, Good) and Evidence (No, Yes) as between-subjects factors, and Case 
Version (Experiment, Plant, Marble, Train) as a within-subjects factor. 
Regarding the within-subjects effects, the ANOVA revealed a significant three-way 
interaction (F(1, 513) = 4.83, p = 0.03, η2 p = 0.03). No other significant within subjects effects were found (all 
p’s > 0.06). The interaction was further examined graphically (see Fig. 2). Looking at the Evidence No conditions, 
one sees that the 
participants’ judgements were always lower when the consequences were bad than 
when they were good, and that Case Version had little effect on this relationship. 
Likewise, looking at the Evidence Yes conditions, one again sees that the participants’ 
judgements were always lower when the consequences were bad than when they were 
good, but dissimilarly the magnitude of this difference depended on Case Version. 
Specifically, the largest difference appears between Bad and Good for Train and the 
smallest difference appears for Experiment. As the three-way interaction is small and 
is not especially relevant to this paper, it will not be discussed further. 
5.4 Experiment 2 discussion 
Experiment 2’s results reveal that, like Experiment 1, there are two factors that are 
important to people when considering epistemic permissibility: consequence and evidence. 
Unlike Experiment 1, when considering the permissibility of beliefs (rather 
than guesses or hypotheses), the effect of Consequence was as strong as the effect 
of Evidence. Also unlike Experiment 1, an interaction emerged between the factors 
Consequence and Evidence. 
6 General discussion 
This discussion section has four main parts. First,we provide our preferred explanation 
of our results. Second, we consider how our results bear on those of Andow’s previous 
study. Third, we articulate some implications of our results for philosophy. Fourth, 
we look at some speculative hypotheses based on our current results and avenues for 
further research. Finally, we take some time to anticipate and respond to a number of 
objections. 
6.1 Preferred explanation 
Grant for the moment that our target item (Justified) measures participants’ intuitions 
about epistemic normativity (but see “Objections and replies”). If so, our results for 
both Experiment 1 and 2 suggest that lay people do not have intuitions that accord with 
a view like DEC: direct consequentialists should not treat the two good consequence 
conditions in such different ways, for the stated consequences of the two relevant 
conditions do not differ in any regard. On the other hand, neither do our results suggest 
that lay intuitions accord with epistemic deontology: deontologists should not treat the 
two conditions where there is evidence (the Evidence Yes conditions) in such different 
ways; these conditions only differ in terms of consequences, and deontologists should 
not consider such differences to be relevant. 
What our results suggest instead is that both the maximization of the epistemic good 
and the presence/absence of evidence are important to lay people when considering 
whether an act is epistemically justified. Thus, we propose a model of lay intuitions 
according to which there are two factors that underlie lay intuitions about epistemic 
permissibility: (1) the extent to which an epistemic act results in the maximization 
of the epistemic good (e.g., true beliefs), and (2) the extent to which an epistemic 
act (e.g., guessing, hypothesizing, believing) enjoys independent support (e.g., evidence). 
Interestingly, our results suggest that the weight that these two factors are 
given depends on the nature of the epistemic act under consideration. For guesses and 
hypotheses, maximization of the epistemic good is given more weight than evidence, 
whereas for beliefs neither factor is dominant. 
6.2 Relation to Andow’s study 
Andow’s (2016a) results might seem to conflict with ours. All the cases used in 
Andow’s paper fall into one of two categories: cases in which a researcher can change 
some equipment or cases in which a researcher can make an assumption (in which it 
is never mentioned that there is evidence and sometimes even stated that there is not). 
Across Andow’s two experiments, he develops five cases that fit the latter category 
(assumption cases) and in all such cases participants consider the epistemic act of 
making an assumption to be impermissible (means between 25 and 41). Our Evidence 
No-Good cases were designed to be roughly analogous to Andow’s assumption cases, 
but our participants’ responses were generally higher (means between 39 and 68). 
Although Andow’s results do seem to conflict with ours, we caution against drawing 
any strong conclusions from the descriptive differences. We are inclined to think that 
Andow’s findings do not present much of challenge to the two-factor model of lay intuitions 
that we proposed (more relevant to this in “Speculative hypotheses and future 
research”). There are many reasons why Andow’s results might be different descriptively. 
The differences could be due to the studies having different designs, or to the 
studies making use of different participant pools (Prolific vs. Amazon Turk participants). 
One notable, potential explanation is that the cases involved in our experiments 
and in Andow’s describe different epistemic acts. Our results reflect intuitions about 
guesses, hypotheses, and beliefs, whereas Andow’s results reflect intuitions about 
assumptions and changing equipment (though the latter is not relevant here). Thus, 
one possible explanation of the differences might be that lay people treat assumptions 
as being particularly epistemically dubious. 
6.3 Philosophical implications 
Let us assume for the sake of discussion that intuitions are indeed relevant to which 
epistemic theory is true. Let us also assume that lay intuitions are relevant to deciding 
whether a philosophical view is intuitive or not, at least in the relevant areas. We 
can now revisit the intuition based objection presented earlier, in Sect. 2, which went 
roughly like this: 
A form of epistemic consequentialism that endorses a deontic theory like DEC 
is committed to the idea that it is epistemically required to accept the Truth 
Fairy’s offer (supposing a veritist account of final value). Intuitively, however, it 
is not epistemically acceptable to believe something that one has no independent 
reason to believe, simply because of the consequences. Thus, such forms of 
epistemic consequentialism are unintuitive and so should be rejected. 
Our results add weight to the idea that the defender of a view like DEC has a heavy 
counterintuitive burden to bear and so supports the above objection. Our evidence is 
stronger than Andow’s, as we looked at intuitions concerning belief, in addition to 
guesses and hypotheses. Intriguingly, our results suggest that a straightforward deontological 
account has a heavy counterintuitive burden too. The results of Experiment 
2 suggest that the maximization of an individual’s epistemic position and independent 
motivation are of equal importance to belief justification. Indeed, it is only when a 
belief will maximize an individual’s epistemic position in addition to having independent 
support that our participants strongly agreed that it is justified. The results of 
Experiment 1, concerning guesses and hypotheses, suggest that the maximization of 
an individual’s epistemic position is more important than independent motivation but 
that both are relevant to justification. 
6.4 Speculative hypotheses and future research 
While our results do not speak in favor of any one specific deontic theory, we can 
nonetheless say more about the overall picture of lay epistemic permissibility that our 
results suggest. The picture is compatible with both monistic and pluralistic accounts 
of final value. The lay deontic picture best supported by our results is one whereby 
two things hold: 
1. There is a two-factor structure for all types of epistemic act: one factor concerns 
maximization and the other concerns independent motivation. 
2. Slightly different deontic theories apply for different types of epistemic act. 
Our results support (1), because both maximization and independent motivation 
were important to our participants when deciding whether an epistemic act is justified. 
Our results support (2), because the relative importance of consequences and 
independent motivation depended on the epistemic act we asked participants to consider. 
The two-factor structure that we consider could be due to a dyadic account of final 
value or to a dyadic deontic theory. It is possible that lay people hold a pluralistic view 
of final value and treat both (i) true beliefs (and perhaps guesses, hypotheses, etc.) 
and (ii) independent support as being of final value. These values might be regarded 
as incommensurable such that an action that results in more, for example, true beliefs 
has greater overall value in one respect (consequentially), and an action involving 
independent support has greater overall value in another (evidentially). Such a pluralistic 
account of final value would presumably be accompanied by a deontic theory that 
took both values into account (e.g., maximize both ormaximize at least one).However, 
perhaps instead, the lay conception of final value might recognize only true beliefs; 
independent support would be only of instrumental epistemic value. Such a monistic 
account of final value is consistent with a two-factor model: the two factors can enter 
the picture at the level of the deontic theory (we will look at some examples shortly). 
We propose the following speculative hypothesis for how (1) and (2), as defined 
above, apply specifically for guesses, hypotheses, and beliefs: 
• Guesses: a guess can be justified despite not enjoying any independent support so 
long as it maximizes. 
• Hypotheses: having independent support is not sufficient for a hypothesis to be 
justified (although it may have a positive influence on levels of justification); the 
hypothesis also needs to maximize. 
• Beliefs: a belief must maximize and enjoy independent support to be justified. 
Both factors independently have a positive influence on levels of justification. 
We might broaden this speculative hypothesis using Andow’s (2016a) results with the 
addition of a slightly different deontic theory for assumptions as follows: 
• Assumptions: maximizing is not sufficient for an assumption to be justified; it also 
needs to have independent support. 
There are many ways to go about testing this speculative hypothesis. Which one a 
researcher should pursue depends on many factors, for example practicality, including 
monetary expense. This said, one method would be to run a large experiment with 
a similar structure to Experiments 1 and 2 but with the addition of the type of epistemic 
act (guesses, hypotheses, beliefs, and assumptions) as a third factor. This would 
produce a 4 × 2 × 2 design. Such an experiment could use similar cases to those we 
used, but it could also use new cases to explore the generalizability of the patterns of 
results we observed (the less alterations from our current experiments the more able 
to engage with our results). The objections and responses to the current experiments, 
which we address in “Objections and replies,” should be kept in mind when designing 
future experiments. 
We will now take some time to consider a more specific issue: what our results tell 
us about the lay understanding regarding the normativity of belief. When discussing 
epistemic normativity, philosophers usually focus on the permissibility of beliefs. 
While we are inclined to think that a more general approach, which looks at a greater 
variety of epistemic actions, is more valuable, we will clarify the take home message 
of our results for those who are primarily interested in beliefs. Again, our current 
results do not speak in favor of any one specific account of the lay understanding of 
epistemic normativity (hereon “lay accounts”). However, they do help to narrow the 
field. In the rest of this section, we will first outline three different, potentially true lay 
accounts compatible with our results. We will then consider how one might go about 
empirically deciding between them. 
The first lay account is a pluralistic one with two necessary conditions: 
Pluralistic, with two necessary conditions (P2NC): a belief that p is epistemically 
permissible for a subject only if (i) believing p maximizes epistemic 
value for the subject, and (ii) the subject’s belief that p enjoys independent 
support. 
P2NC represents an important alternative to simple direct consequentialist and deontological 
lay accounts, in placing importance on both consequences and independent 
motivation. 
The second lay account places less importance on the distinction between permissibility 
and impermissibility using necessary conditions, but has a certain isomorphism 
with P2NC. It is a pluralistic lay account with two multiplicative factors: 
Pluralistic, with two multiplicative factors (P2MF): A belief that p is more epistemically 
permissible for a subject if it has (i) better epistemic consequences, 
or (ii) enjoys independent support, and (iii) the extent to which having better 
epistemic consequences leads to greater permissibility is greater the more independent 
support. 
The third lay account tries to maintain a purely consequentialist and purely veritist 
explanation of epistemic value. It is thus amonistic lay account, and has two necessary 
conditions (one direct consequentialist condition and one indirect): 
Monistic,with two necessary conditions (M2NC):Abelief that p is epistemically 
permissible for a subject only if (i) believing p maximizes true beliefs for the 
subject, and (ii) the subject’s believing that p conforms to a rule for belief formation, 
the adoption of which would maximize true beliefs for the subject, where 
“only form beliefs that have independent support” is such a maximizing rule. 
How might future empirical research decide between these lay accounts? The three 
lay accounts differ along two dimensions: (a) some are monistic about final epistemic 
value, while others are pluralistic; (b) some exploit necessary conditions for permissibility, 
while others involve linear relationships between permissibility and the factors 
which influence permissibility.10 How might one investigate whether the folk entertain 
monist or pluralist views? One would need to distinguish between participants 
who are sensitive to a particular factor (e.g., evidence) and who treat that factor as 
having final epistemic value, and participants who are sensitive to that same factor 
but treat it as having only instrumental epistemic value. We think that distinguishing 
between such participants without qualitative insights will be very difficult. Thus, to 
determine whether the folk are monists or pluralists,we propose the use of focus group 
discussions and/or interviews or similar.11 
How might one investigate whether the folk understand the normativity of belief 
to employ necessary conditions or a more linear relationship? What follows shows 
how one can, in principle, empirically determine whether the lay account employs a 
necessary condition or a more linear relationship with respect to a single variable. 
We propose collecting responses from participants at a range of values of this variable. 
We propose then looking at whether the relationship between the dependent 
and independent variable is best captured by a linear function or a nonlinear function 
(e.g., modelled using sigmoidal curves). One should determine whether a linear 
regression model or a nonlinear regression model (e.g., one that uses a sigmoidal function) 
better predicts the data. If a nonlinear sigmoidal model (or similar) were a better 
predictor, this would be a sign that the participants were operating with a conception 
that employs thresholds, e.g., necessary conditions. See Fig. 3 for an illustration 
of a hypothetical set of findings depicting nonlinear sigmoidal and linear regression 
lines. 
6.5 Objections and replies 
Before closing, let us say something to anticipate and respond to a few possible worries 
about our results and our interpretation of them. We will look at five objections. 
Objection 1: these results likely reflect some moral attitudes rather than participants’ 
intuitions about epistemic normativity. This is a genuine concern about 
empirical research in this domain. Andow (2016a) discusses various reasons why it is 
difficult to design questions that clearly probe intuitions about epistemic normativity 
rather than, for example, intuitions about what is morally permissible. The probes we 
use employ the word “justified,” which frequently occurs in moral discourse. So, it 
may be that participants are reporting their moral intuitions rather than their epistemic 
intuitions. However, we are inclined to think that this is not the case. If our participants 
are reporting their moral intuitions, then, for example, they must have strong moral 
objections to guessing on the basis of no evidence when doing so will not maximize 
one’s epistemic position, but have no such moral objections when doing so will maximize 
one’s epistemic position. This strikes us as rather implausible. The issues at 
stake and the overall context seem clearly epistemic and not moral. This said, this 
seems to be an empirically tractable issue, and we welcome attempts to investigate it 
further. 
Objection 2: for guesses and hypotheses in particular it is plausible that participants 
assessed pragmatic rather than epistemic justification.14 All of the cases 
we used were purposefully written to depict scenarios in which there is little practically 
at stake for the subject. For example, at the train station, Sam is not trying 
to catch a train but is simply recording train arrival times. The cases do not explicitly 
exclude the possibility that there is much practically at stake, but they do not 
invite any such interpretation either. So, we are not too concerned that our results 
track participants’ intuitions about pragmatic justification. Nonetheless, we can point 
to nothing about our results that would definitively rule out such a possibility. Intuitions 
about both epistemic and pragmatic justification might be influenced by both 
considerations of epistemic utility and of independent support. We welcome further 
research on this issue. We suspect that some form of protocol analysis may 
be needed to firmly ascertain whether participants are assessing the permissibility 
of acts epistemically or pragmatically, or indeed whether they clearly distinguish the 
two.15 
Objection 3: the study is concerned specifically with the epistemic acceptability 
of particular acts (e.g., forming a belief), but the statements that participants were 
ultimately asked about might have been interpreted as being about epistemic objects 
(the beliefs themselves). The reason for this concern is that the statements literally 
asked about “the guess,” “the hypothesis,” and “the belief,” not “the subject’s making 
the guess,” “the subject’s making the hypothesis,” and “the subject’s forming 
the belief.” We did this because we felt it was more vernacular and easier to read 
and understand. However, what we did could be seen as a problem, because perhaps 
in some objective sense, the belief, for instance, is justified, even if the particular 
subject is not justified in forming it. We appreciate this concern, but we think it 
unlikely that our participants were confused about what we meant. They had just 
read a case about making a guess or hypothesis or forming a belief, and they had to 
answer comprehension questions about the case. The relevant case continued to be 
displayed when they arrived at the page asking for their response to the target item 
(Justified). 
Objection 4: Case Type was a between-subjects variable, and so we cannot comment 
on whether there are order effects of Case Type. This is true and a limitation 
of our study. The study was designed this way deliberately. The reason was to avoid 
the complication of order effects for Case Type before we have understood the basic 
components underlying participants’ intuitions about epistemic normativity. Experimental 
research using ethical trolley cases, which are analogous in notable respects 
to our cases, has revealed robust order effects (Wiegmann et al. 2012). It is an open 
question whether intuitions about epistemic normativity exhibit similar effects. Having 
investigated the basic components underlying participants’ intuitions, we think a 
reasonable course of action for future research is to examine order effects. It would 
be particularly intriguing to see whether they are similar to the order effects known 
for moral cases.16 
Objection 5: what is and is not intuitive to non-philosophers is of no relevance to 
philosophical epistemology. At least one of the current authors is inclined to think 
that this objection is deeply mistaken: a central part of philosophy is and should be an 
attempt to make sense of our ordinary pre-theoretic ways of thinking about philosophically 
interesting phenomena such as epistemic normativity (Andow 2016b). Given 
this stance, it should be clear why one would think a proper empirically-informed 
understanding of how non-philosophers think about epistemic normativity is important 
to philosophical epistemology. Another of the current authors does not think that 
a central part of philosophy is (or should be) to make sense of our ordinary pretheoretic 
ways of thinking but still disagrees with the objection, in that he thinks 
making sense of our pre-theoretic ways of thinking is an instrumental part of philosophy. 
Regardless, such metaphilosophical worries are outside the scope of this 
article. Those concerned with such worries must recognize that many epistemologists 
think that theorizing in epistemology should be sensitive to intuitions.17 Hence, our 
results provide an important source of information for philosophers working in this 
area. 
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